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FEDERAL LAW-WIRETAPS
United States v. Donavan, 429 U.S. 413.

The Supreme Court in United States v. Donovan' examined the wiretap identification and
notice requirements of Title III of the Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.2 The
act sets out a detailed procedure for the judicial
authorization of wiretaps and other forms of
electronic surveillance designed to meet the
fourth amendment standards of Berger v. New
York' and Katz v. United States.4 The Court
clarified the duty imposed on the Government
to identify those who are not named in the
original authorization but whose intercepted
conversations give the Government probable
cause to believe them guilty of a crime. The
Court also decided that the Government has
an implied statutory duty to provide more
complete information to the issuing judge concerning unnamed but overheard individuals so
that he may excercise informed discretion in
notifying such parties as required by the act.

Prior cases interpreting Title III have developed a unique analytical model which separates
the issue of statutory violation from the issue
of suppression of evidence under the Act.
Donovan refines and entrenches that model.
In November of 1972 a special agent of the
FBI applied for authorization to intercept telephone conversations on four telephones in two
Ohio cities. The application was supported by
an affidavit fully complying with the procedural provisions of Title III 5 and showing that
1 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Title III).
3 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
4 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2518. Donovan interprets §§ 2518(1)

(b)(iv) and 2518(8)(d). The full text of these provisions
follows:
§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wire or
oral communications
(1) Each application for an order authorizing
or approving the interception of a wire or oral
communication shall be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent
jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application shall include the following information:
(b) a full and complete statement of the

the Government had probable cause to believe
that the telephones were being used to conduct
an illegal gambling operation. Title III requires
that a Government application indicate "the
identity of the person, if known, committing
the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted." 6 Accordingly, six individuals
and "others as yet unknown" were named in
the application as subjects of the wiretap.
facts and circumstances relied upon by the
applicant, to jusify his belief that an order
should be issued, including (i) details as to
the particular offense that has been, is
being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a
particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which or the
place where the communication is to be
intercepted, (iii) a particular description of
the type of communications sought to be
intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person,
if known, committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted;
[8](d) Within a reasonable time but not later
than ninety days after the filing of an application
for an order of approval under section 2518(7)
(b) which is denied or the termination of the
period of an order or extensions thereof, the
issuing or denying judge shall cause to be
served, on the persons named in the order or
the application, and such other parties to intercepted communications as the judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of
justice, an inventory which shall include notice
of(1) the fact of the entry of the order or
the application;
(2) the date of the entry and the period
of authorized, approved or disapproved
interception, or the denial of the applica-

tion; and
(3)the fact that during the period wire
or oral communications were or were not
intercepted.
The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may in
his discretion make available to such person or
his counsel for inspection such portions of the
intercepted communications, applications and
orders as the judge determines to be in the
interest of justice. On an ex parte showing of
good cause to a judge of competent jurisdiction
the serving of the inventory required by his
subsection may be postponed.
t 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv).
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Donovan and two of the other respondents
were unknown to the government at that time
and were not identified. The district court
authorized a fifteen day interception. During
this period the Government intercepted conversations of three of the respondents-Donovan, Robbins and Buzzaco-indicating that
they were a part of the gambling operation. At
the conclusion of the fifteen day period, the
Government requested and received authorization for a fifteen day extension of the wiretaps. The application for the extension named
several individuals and "others as yet unknown." Although the Government had probable cause to believe that Donovan, Robbins
and Buzzaco were involved in the gambling
operation, they were not identified. 7
Title III also requires that the judge issuing
the authorization order cause an inventory giving notice of the interception to be served on
"the persons named in the order or application, and such other parties to intercepted
communications as the judge may determine
in his discretion that [sic] is in the interest of
justice."S
These inventories are to be served no later
than ninety days after the termination of the
wiretap.' In February of 1973, the Government
submitted a proposed order to the district court
giving the required notice of interception to
thirty-seven persons, among them Donovan,
Robbins and Buzzaco. The Government believed this to be a complete list of all identifiable
persons whose communications had been intercepted. In fact, the proposed order was not
complete and although two names were later
added to the list, no formal notice was ever
given to two of the five respondents-Merlo
and Lauer.' 0
In November of 1973 a grand jury returned
indictments charging seventeen persons, among
them Donovan, Robbins, Buzzaco, Merlo and
Lauer, with conspiracy to conduct and conducting an illegal gambling operation. The five
respondents made motions to suppress all
taped conversations in which they had participated. 1 The district court granted the motions
7 429

U.S. at 416-22.
8 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
9Id. On a showing of good cause the 90 day limit
may be extended.
10429 U.S. at 420-22.

11429 U.S. at 421. The motions were made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) which authorizes
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and the government appealed. A divided panel
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.12 The circuit court found that'the Government's failure to identify Donovan, Robbins
and Buzzaco on the application for extension
when it had probable cause to believe" they
were a part of the conspiracy violated section
2518(I)(b)(iv) of the act and required suppression. The court also held that the failure to
provide the names of Merlo and Lauer to the
issuing judge and the resulting failure to notify
them required suppression. 3 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari 4 and reversed, holding that although the Act had been violated,
proper parties to make such motions on specified
grounds. See note 5 supra. The motions alleged that
the wiretap evidence was "unlawfully intercepted"
within the meaning of § 2518(10)(a)(i) due to government violations of §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) and (8)(d), the
identification and notice requirements.
2 513 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals concluded that the government's failure to
identify Donovan, Robbins and Buzzaco was a violation of § 2518(1)(b)(iv) and that the resulting evidence
was "unlawfully intercepted" and subject to a motion
to suppress. Id. at 342. Suppression was also appropriate as to Merlo and Lauer. Id. at 344. It should be
noted that the lower court utilized the preferred
analytical model in reaching this conclusion. The
court carefully considered two distinct issues. First,
whether there was in fact a violation of the statute
and, second, whether the provision violated is a
sufficiently central part of the congressional scheme
to limit unlawful wiretaps to warrant suppression.
The court observed that, "[s]uppression is required
if there is a breach of a Title III provision that
'directly and substantially implements' the congressional scheme to limit the use of electronic surveillance." Id. at 344. The Supreme Court applied the
same analysis but came to the opposite conclusion.
Given the Court's analytical model, it would seem
that the Court will face many more cases where
lower courts disagree as to what is a central provision
of Title III.
Engle, J., concurred in the lower court opinion as
to Donovan, Robbins and Buzzaco but dissented as
to Merlo and Lauer. He concluded that since the
notice provisions came into play only after the interception, they cannot be considered a part of the plan
to limit the use of electronic surveillance. 513 F.2d at
345 (Engle, J., concurring). A different standard
seemed appropriate for post intercept violations.
Judge Engle would limit suppression to those "instances in which the government's violation was
shown to be deliberate or where, if not deliberate,
there is a showing of actual prejudice which cannot
be cured by less drastic remedies .... Id. at 346.
Since Merlo and Lauer had actual, though not formal, notice suppression should not be required.
13 See note 12supra.
.4 424 U.S. 907 (1976).
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suppression was not required in this instance.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, applied
the analytical model developed in prior cases
arising under Title III. Suppression of wiretap
evidence is required only when a provision of
the statute is violated which is central to the
congressional scheme to limit electronic surveillance. Since the identification and notice provisions are not so central, suppression is not
required when they are inadvertently violated.
To understand the Court's puzzling conclusion requires an explication of the relevant
provisions of the statute and the analytical
model developed to deal with suppression
questions. Title III includes a statutory version
of the exclusionary rule long familiar in fourth
amendment cases. Three sections are of interest: sections 2515, 2517(3) and 2518(10)(a). The
first of these sections flatly excludes wiretapped
conversations as evidence where that disclosure
would be in violation of the statute:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has
been intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before
any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee,
or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure
of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.'15
The Senate Report on S. 917, which was
later enacted as the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, reveals that the
drafters considered section 2515 a vital sanction. "Section 2515 of the new chapter imposes
an evidentiary sanction to compel compliance
with the other prohibitions of the chapter. 16
1518 U.S.C. § 2515. This flat prohibition has had
a very broad impact. The Supreme Court has even
held that a grand jury witness who has refused to
testify about intercepted communications or in response to questions based on intercepted communications may assert the illegality of the wiretap under
§ 2515 as a defense to a contempt charge. See Gelbard
v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). Even so, a
motion to suppress is not available to a grand jury
witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).
16S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWs 2112, 2184
[hereinafter cited as S. REP.] Subsequent Senate
Report citations are to the U.S. CODE, COrNG. & AD.
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More importantly, section 2515 was conceived
as a measure to protect the privacy of wire
communications from unlawful interception:
Such a suppression rule is necessary and proper
to protect privacy ....
The provision thus
forms an intregral part of the system of limitations designed to protect privacy. Along with
the criminal and civil remedies, it should serve
to guarantee that the standards of the new
chapter will sharply curtail the unlawful17interception of wire and oral communications.
Section 2515 is intended to embody the judicial exclusionary rule in statutory form. The
section:
largely reflects existing law. It applies to suppressed evidence directly or indirectly obtained
in violation of the chapter. There is, however,
no intention to change the attenuation rule.
Nor generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure
law. 1s
Section 2517 defines the individuals authorized to disclose wiretap information gained in
accordance with the provisions of the chapter.
Section 2517(3) allows disclosure of the fruits
of wiretaps as evidence in criminal prosecutions. 19
17

Id.at 2185.
SId. at 2185 (citations omitted). The report cites
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), apparently as a statement of the scope of the exclusionary
rule in "present search and seizure law." In Walder,
illegally seized evidence of heroin trafficking excluded at the defendant's first trial was introduced
for impeachment at a subsequent trial on similar
charges. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
upheld the use of such evidence for impeachment
purposes. Id. at 65. In the course of the opinion,
Justice Frankfurter gave this statement of the familiar
judicial exclusionary rule: "The Government cannot
violate the Fourth Amendment-in the only way in
which the Government can do anything, namely
through its agents-and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction." Id. at 64-65
(footnote omitted). If this is the proposition for
which WaIder is cited, support is lent to the proposition that § 2515 is intended to operate against fourth
amendment violations only.
19 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) states:
Any person who has received by any means
authorized by this chapter, any information concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may
disclose the contents of that communication or
such derivative evidence while giving testimony

WIRETAPS

The final provision in the statutory suppression scheme is section 2518(10)(a). Section 2518
generally contains the procedural requirements
of a valid wiretap authorization. Section
2518(10)(a) provides a remedy for the rights
created in sections 2515 and 2517. An "aggrieved person

' 20

may make a motion to sup-

press evidence in certain proceedings on any
one of three grounds specified in the statute.
A motion may be made on the ground that the
evidence was "unlawfully intercepted," or that
the authorization was insufficient on its face,
or that the interception was not conducted
in
2
conformity to an otherwise valid order. '
An understanding of the interrelation of
these three sections is vital to an effective understanding of the role of suppression under
Title III. The legislative history discusses this
interrelation. Section 2515 "must, of course, be
read in the light of section 2518(10)(a) ...

which defines the class entitled to make a
under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any court of the United States or of
any State or in any Federal or State grand jury
proceeding.
20 18
U.S.C. § 2510(11): "'Aggrieved person'
means a person who was a party to any intercepted
wire or oral communication or a person against
whom the interception was directed."
21 Section 2518(10)(a) reads as follows:
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial,
hearing, or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
or other authority of the United States, a State,
or a political subdivision thereof, may move to
suppress the contents of any intercepted wire
or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, on the grounds that(i) the communication was unlawfully
intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is
insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in
conformity with the order of authorization
or approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial,
hearing, or proceeding unless there was no
opportunity to make such motion or the person
was not aware of the grounds of the motion. If
the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence
derived shall be treated as having been obtained
in violation of this chapter. The judge, upon
the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, may in his discretion make available to the
aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection
such portions of the intercepted communication
or evidence derived therefrom as the judge
determines to be in the interests ofjustice.
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motion to suppress."" Further guidance is
found in the Senate Report's discussion of
2518(10)(a). "This provision must be read in
connection with sections 2515 and 2517 ...
which it limits. It provides a remedy for the
right created by section 2515."23
The legislative history indicates that
2518(10)(a) was intended as a procedural requirement. It is a remedy for rights created in
other sections of the statute. 24 A common sense
interpretation of the interrelation of these
three provisions would lead to the view that
any infraction of the detailed procedural requirements of section 2518 would render the
resulting evidence inadmissible under sections
2515 and 2517(3) on a motion to suppress made
by a proper party. However, Court interpretations have rejected such a "common sense"
view in favor of a more complex analytical
model which requires suppression only when a
provision of section 2518 central to the congressional scheme limiting the unlawful use of
wiretaps is violated. The provisions of section
2518 are therefore enforced
selectively through
25
the exclusion of evidence.
The leading cases establishing this analytical
model are United States v. Giordano26 and United
2
States v. ChavezY.
Title III requires that an
application for a wiretap be authorized by the
"Attorney General, or any assistant Attorney
General specially designated by the Attorney
General. ' 28 Prior to 1972, the Justice Department had adopted an administrative procedure
S.REP., supra note 16, at 2185.
at 2195.
24 The Court often obscures the procedural character of this section by focusing on subparagraphs
(i), (ii) and (iii) without reference to §§ 2515 and
2517. The latter sections create the right enforceable
through the former section.
25 This "common sense" view is evident in many
cases. For example, United States v. Eastman, 465
F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972), construed the Act to require
suppression of evidence obtained "in violation of"
the wording of the statute "which implements the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1063. The court in Eastman did not make any hard distinctions between
statutory and constitutional violations. Since Title III
"implements" the fourth amendment, a violation of
the statute is also a violation of the defendant's
"constitutional rights." Id. at 1064. See also United
States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d. 1143 (8th Cir. 1972).
26 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
27 416 U.S. 562 (1974). Both Chavez and Giordano
involved narcotics violations.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).
22

3Id.
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which routed all requests for electronic surveillance through the Attorney General's office. If
the application was approved, the Attorney
General would initial the application and direct
an assistant Attorney General to send a form
letter authorizing the application to the attorney in the field. This form letter falsely indicated that the asssitant Attorney General had
personally reviewed the application. When the
Attorney General was indisposed, his executive
assistant assumed the duty of initialing wiretap
requests and forwarding them to the assistant
Attorney General. 29 In Giordano, the wiretap
application was authorized by the executive
assistant, though the authorization form letter
stated that the assistant Attorney General had
personally authorized the application. In
Chavez, the application had been authorized by
the Attorney General, though the form letter
misidentified the authorizing official. Both
Giordano and Chavez argued that this procedure was a violation of section 2516 and required suppression of the resulting evidence.
The Supreme Court held that suppression
was required as to Giordano, but not as to
Chavez. The Court concluded after an examination of the legislative history that the requirement that specific politically responsive officials
authorize applications is a central feature of
the congressional scheme to regulate the interception of conversations." Suppression was
therefore required. But suppression was not
required when the correct official authorized
the application, even though he was misidentified.
At the outset, the Court noted that "[t]he
issue does not turn on the judicially fashioned
exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations
of Fourth Amendament rights, but upon the
provisions of Title III."'3 The Government
argued that even if section 2516 had been
violated, the interception was not "unlawful"
within the meaning of section 2518(10)(a)(i).
2'See 416 U.S. at 510, 564-66 for a more detailed
account ofJustice Department procedures.
30416 U.S. at 512-22. The Court concluded:
To us, it appears wholly at odds with the scheme
and history of the Act to construe § 2516(1) to
permit the Attorney General to delegate his
authority at will, whether it be to his Executive
Assistant or to any officer in the Department
other than an Assistant Attorney General.
416 U.S. at 523 (footnote omitted).
31Id. at 524.

The Court summarized the Governments argument: "the Government contends that approval by the wrong official is a statutory violation only and that paragraph [2518(10)(a)] (i)
must be construed to reach constitutional, but
not statutory, violations.132 The Court con-

ceded that this argument was substantial, but
concluded that "unlawful" was intended to encompass constitutional violations and some statutory violations. "Unlawful" must refer to at
least some constitutional violations. The Court
said:
Suppression for lack of probable cause, for
example, is not provided for in so many words
and must fall within paragraph (i) unless, as is
most unlikely, the statutory suppression procedures were not intended to reach constitutional
violations at all. On the other hand paragraphs
(ii) and (iii) plainly reach some purely statutory
defaults without constitutional overtones, and
these omissions cannot be deemed unlawful interceptions under paragraph (i), else there
would have been no necessity for paragraphs
(ii) and (iii)-or to put the matter another way,
if unlawful interceptions under paragraph (i)
include purely statutory issues, paragraphs (ii)

and (iii) are drained of all meaning and are
surpusage.

Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) clearly reach statutory violations -facially insufficient orders
and failures to conduct a wiretap in accordance
with a facially sufficient order.3 4 The Government argued that these paragraphs could be
meaningful only if they referred to matters not
"unlawful" within the meaning of subparagraph (i). "Unlawfully intercepted" must therefore refer only to violations of fourth amendment rights. The Court said:
The conclusion of the argument is that if nonconstitutional omissions reached by paragraphs

(ii) and (iii) are not unlawful interceptions under
paragraph (i), then there is no basis for holding
that "unlawful interceptions" include any such
statutory matters; the only purely statutory
transgressions warranting suppression are those
falling within paragraph (ii) and (iii)."

The Court conceded that simultaneous effect
cannot be given to all three subparagraphs
32

Id. at 525.
MId. at 526.
'4 See note 21 supra for the full text of this section.
-1416 U.S. at 526.
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unless some purely statutory violations are ex-

visions are not central to the congressional

cluded from the scope of "unlawfully inter-

plan, violation will not require suppression:

cepted.

'36

But the Government's argument

proved too much. It does not follow that all
statutory violations must be so excluded. The
Court concluded:
The words "unlawfully intercepted" are themselves not limited to constitutional violations,
and we think Congress intended to require
suppression where there is failure to satisfy any
of those statutory requirements that directly and
substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of.intercept procedures to
those situations clearly calling for the employ37
ment of this extraordinary investigative device.
Since section 2516 is such a provision, a
violation like that in Giordano will require suppression.
The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to "press the scope of the
suppression role beyond current search and
seizure law." '36 In Giordano, the Government

put considerable emphasis on this language,
3 9
but the Court was not impressed.
Thus, two distinct issues must be considered
in a Title III suppression question: (1) whether
there was in fact a violation of the statute and
(2) whether the provision violated "directly and
substantially" furthered the congressional intention to limit the use of wiretaps. Where the
statutory provision is not so central, governmental negligence will be allowed, though not
encouraged.

40

Chavez illustrates the selectivity of enforcement resulting from the analytical model established in Giordano. While section 2516 was not
violated where the Attorney General actually
approved the application, 4i sections 2518(1)(a)
and (4)(d) were violated when the authorizing
official was misidentified. 42 Yet since these pro36 Id. at
37 Id.

527.

" S. REP.,supra note 16, at 2185.
416 U.S. at 528.

39

40 Chavez concludes with the suggestion that "strict
adherence by the Government to the provisions of
Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with
the responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it
when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic
surveillance is sought." 416 U.S. at 580.
41 Id. at 574.
42 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(a) and (4)(d) are virtually identical. The first describes the identification require-

ment in an application while the second proscribes
the form of the authorization order.

While adherence to the identification reporting

requirements of §§ 2518 (1)(a) and (4)(d) thus
can simplify the assurance that those whom
Title III makes responsible for determining
when and how wiretapping and electronic surveillance should be conducted have fulfilled
their roles in each case, it does not establish a
substantive role to be played in the regulatory

system .43
Suppression was not required as to Chavez.

44

43 416 U.S. at 577-78. The Court concluded its
opinion with an analysis of the relevant provisions of
the Senate Report in support of its position. See id. at

578-80.

44Justice Douglas strongly dissented from this selective enforcement of the provisions of Title III.

416 U.S. at 583 (Douglas J., dissenting). He found
the language of the statute unambiguous in requiring
the exclusion of any evidence obtained in violation
of even a "non-central" provision:
I cannot agree that Title III, fairly read, authorizes the courts to pick and choose among various
statutory provisions, suppressing evidence only
when they determine that a provision is "substantive," "central," or "directly and substantially" related to the congressional scheme.
Section 2515 of Title III unambiguously provides that no evidence derived from any intercepted communication may be received "in any
trial ... in or before any court ...
if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter." The Court acknowledges
this provision in Chavez, ante, at 575, but disregards two sections of Title III explicitly dealing
with disclosure in determining when disclosure
is in fact "in violation of" Title III. Section 2511
(1), which provides criminal penalties for willful
violations of Title III, prohibits in § 2511(l)(c)
knowing disclosure of communications intercepted in violation of subsection (1), and the
subsection prohibits interception "[ejxcept as
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter."
§ 2511(1)(a). Section 2517(3) authorizes the disclosure in a criminal proceeding of information
received "by any means authorized by this chapter" or of evidence derived from a communication "intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." The statute does not
distinguish between the various provisions of
the Title, and it seems evident that disclosure is
"in violation of" Title III when there has not
been compliance with any of its requirements.
Id. at 584-85. Douglas, too, saw difficulty in giving
simultaneous effect to sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and
(iii) of § 2518(10)(a), but he saw merely a certain
redundancy resulting from "a degree of excessive
cautiousness." Id. at 586. The other choice, for which
the Court opted, seemed to Douglas to attribute a
"foolishness" to Congress which led it to enact

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

In the course of its opinion, the Court elaborates on the Giordano analysis:
Though we rejected, in Giordano, the Government's claim that Congress intended "unlawfully
intercepted" communications to mean only
those intercepted in violation of constitutional
requirements, we did not go so far as to suggest
that every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render
the interception of wire or oral communications

"unlawful." To establish such a rule would be at
odds with the statute itself. Under § 2515, suppression is not mandated for every violation of
Title III, but only if "disclosure" of the contents
of intercepted communications, or derivative
evidence, would be in violation of Title III.
Moreover, as we suggested in Giordano, it is
apparent from the scheme of the section that
paragraph (i) was not intended to reach every
failure to follow statutory procedures, else paragraphs (ii) and (iii) would be drained of meaning. Giordano holds that paragraph (i) does include any "failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement the congressional intention to limit
the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this
extraordinary investigative device." 45

"statutory provisions for law enforcement officials to
scurry about satisfying when it did not consider the
provisions significant enough to enforce by suppression." Id. at 586. Looking to §§ 2515 and 2517, Douglas thought that "unlawful" clearly must refer to
disclosures "in violation of the act." Accordingly,
Title III "means what it says." Id. at 586.
Justice Marshall echoed these concerns in his disJustice Douglas concurred in the result in
sent to Donovan, 429 U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting), though he found that even under the Giordanoand dissented in Chavez .4 He worried
Court's rationale suppression was not required:
that the Court had opened the door to "the
I continue to adhere to the position expressed
creation of other non-central statutory requirefor four members of the Court by Mr. Justice
ments. ' 47 Donovan is the first case to step
Douglas in his dissent in United States v. Chavez,
through that door. It entrenches and refines
416 U.S. 562, 584-85 (1974), that Title III does
not authorize "the courts to pick and choose
the Giordano analysis of Title III suppression
among various statutory provisions, suppressing
questions .4
evidence only when they determine that a proIn Donovan the Court again noted that the
vision is 'substantive,' 'central,' or 'directly and
judicially created exclusionary rule was not at
substantially related to the congressional
scheme."'. But even under the standard set
45 416 U.S. at 574-75.
forth in Giordano and Chavez and reaffirmed by
the Court today ...

the evidence at issue here

should be suppressed.
Id. at 445-46. The Court focused on whether the
additional information resulting from full compliance could have affected the decision to issue the
warrant. The Court ignored the identification requirement's function as a "statutory trigger." Section
2518 (1)(e) requires that an application disclose all
previous applications "involving any of the same
persons . . . specified in the application." 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(1)(e). A violation of the identification requirement evades this duty. Further, the identification
provision triggers the mandatory notice provision.
To the extent that violations of the identification
requirement are allowed, these provisions may be
frustrated. Suppression should therefore be required. 429 U.S. at 446-49.
Justice Marshall believed that the Court makes a
similar error in discussing the notification requirement. "Again, the Court takes too narrow a view of
the provision at issue, ignoring its place in the system
Congress has created to restrain wiretapping." Id. at
449. Discretionary notice is tied to the civil remedies
afforded injured parties by § 2520. The Senate Report observes that "[i]t is expected that civil suits, if
any, will instead grow out of the filing of inventories."
S. REP.,supra note 16, at 2196. The Court has created
an opportunity to limit the dangers of civil actions
and to that extent has dismantled the congressional
scheme. 429 U.S. at 449-50.

46

47

416 U.S. at 484. See note 44.

Id. at 587.

46The principal provision at issue in Donovan is
the identification provision of § 2518(1)(b)(iv). That
section requires the government to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense
whose communications are to be intercepted." The
legislative history of this provision is scanty and
unilluminating. A section by section analysis of the
new act merely paraphrases the provision. See S.
REP., supra note 16, at 2184. In connection with
§ 2518(4)(d), the parallel provision requiring identification of the person committing the offense in the
authorization order, the Senate Report cites West v.
Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894). West involved a civil action
for false imprisonment. Vandy West was arrested on
a warrant for the arrest of James West for murder.
He was released after several days when it became
apparent that the wrong West had been arrested.
On appeal, the Supreme Court said:
The principle of the common law, by which
warrants of arrest, in cases criminal or civil,
must specifically name or describe the person to
be arrested, has been affirmed in the American
constitutions; and by the great weight of authority in this country, a warrant that does not do so
will not justify the officer in making the arrest.
Id. at 86. A warrant that does not meet this fourth
amendment requirement is void on its face as a
general warrant. Id.
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issue ." The question of suppression under the
statute was again divided into two entirely distinct issues. The Court concluded the first issue
in the respondents' favor-Title III does indeed require the identification of all individuals
whom the Government has probable cause to
believe are using the telephone in question for
illegal purposes." The Government had argued that only the principal target of the wiretap need be identified.5 ' The Government
based its argument on the plain meaning of
the statute. The word "person" is singular in
the relevant sections. It clearly refers to the
individual whose telephone "is to be monitored ."52 This is not to say that every application need identify only one person. It is conceivable that several persons could use the same
telephone to commit an offense in which case
they all would be "principal targets." The Government maintained a distinction between
those who operate the target telephone to place
and receive calls and those who use unmonitored telephones to call into the wiretapped
instrument. Only those who use the telephone
to receive such calls are to be identified," even
though the Government has probable cause to
believe that specific individuals will be calling
into the monitored number in furtherance of
the criminal offense.
The Court summarily rejected this interpretation. The use of the plural "persons" in other
sections of the statute make it clear that Congress anticipated occasions when more than
one person would be identified in the application and order. 54 On its face the statutory
description of those who must be identified is
"as applicable to a suspect placing calls to the
target telephone as it is to a suspect placing
calls from that telephone."5 5 The Court's analysis of the legislative history confirmed this
result.5 "
49 429 U.S. at 432 n.22 (quoting Giordano, 416 U.S.

at 524).
'0 The Court said: "We therefore conclude that a
wiretap application must name an individual if the
Government has probable cause to believe that the
individual is engaged in the criminal activity under
investigation and expects to intercept the individual's
conversations over the target telephone." Id. at 428.
51Id. at 424.
52 Id.
-1 Id. Also see note 12supra.
54 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) & (1)(e).
-5
56 429 U.S. at 425.
Id. at 426-28.
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Merlo and Lauer argued that the Government had an implied statutory duty to inform
the issuing judge of the names of all parties
intercepted. The Court agreed that the Government had an implied duty to provide sufficient information for the issuing judge to exercise discretion in giving notice, but found that
it would be sufficient for the Government to
identify the categories into which unnamed but
overheard parties fell. The Court rejected the
Government's contention that it was inappropriate to read such an implied duty into the
Act when any information 5was
available to the
7
issuing judge at his request.
However, the Court determined that a violation of these duties will not require suppression. The Court refined the Giordano model in
reaching this conclusion. Although the Govern57

Id. at 430-31. The Court adopted the reasoning
of United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.
1974). In Chun, the Government originally decided
not to indict certain unnamed but overheard suspects
and thus did not provide their names to the issuing
judge. The Government later decided to seek indictments but did not inform the issuing judge of the
change in circumstances. Accordingly, these defendants never received inventory notice. The defendants
moved to suppress the evidence as unlawfully intercepted and the motions were granted. The Government appealed and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions because of
the inadequate factual record. The court carefully
separated the issues of suppression under the fourth
amendment through the judicial exclusionary rule
and suppression under the statute. Should the district
court find that because of the Government's failure
to provide "prompt" notice, the defendants were not
"afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare an
adequate response to the evidence which has been
derived from the interception," id. at 538, suppression would be required under the fourth amendment. In interpreting the statute the court concluded
that the obligation of the issuing judge to give discretionary notice can be properly fulfulled only when
there is adequate information available to him. The
court said:

To discharge this obligation the judicial officer
must have, at a minimum, knowledge of the
particular categories into which fall all the individuals whose conversations have been intercepted. Thus, while precise identification of
each party to an intercepted communication is
not required, a description of the general class,
or classes, whicl4 they comprise is essential to
enable the judge to determine whether additional information is necessary for a proper
evaluation of the interests of the various parties.
Id. at 540. The Supreme Court quoted this passage
and adopted its "balanced construction" of the act.
429 U.S. at 430.
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ment violated the identification requirement,
the information supplied to the judge was sufficient to authorize the wiretap. It is highly
improbable that the additional names would
have altered his judgment. Suppression is required only when the misconduct is such that
the issuing judge might not have granted the
application if there had been full compliance
with the statute. The Court said:
Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions to judicial authorization were satisfied,
and the issuing judge was simply unaware that
additional persons might be overheard engaging
in incriminating conversations. In no meaningful sense can it be said that the presence of that
information as to additional targets would have
precluded judicial authorization of the intercept. Rather, this case resembles Chavez, where
we held that a wiretap was not unlawful simply
because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as to which designated official had authorized the application. The Chavez intercept
was lawful because the Justice Department had
performed its task of prior approval, and the
instant intercept is lawful because the application provided sufficient information to enable
the issuingjudge to determine that the statutory
conditions were satisfied. s
In Donovan neither of the Government's
violations required suppression. The statutory
provisions involved were not central to the
congressional scheme. The provisions in question are merely ancillary to that scheme.
Analysis of the prior case law reveals that
very few courts have been willing to apply the
suppression sanction to violations of the notification and identification requirements. Many
courts believed that the identification issue had
been decided in United States v. Kahn. 9 In
Kahn, a court authorized a wiretap identifying
Irving Kahn and "others as yet unknown" as
the targets of the wiretap. Conversations implicating Mrs. Kahn in her hushand's gambling
operation were intercepted. Both Mr. and Mrs.
Kahn were later indicted. The defendants
moved to suppress the evidence gained from
429 U.S. at 436 (footnotes omitted). Justice Marshall believed that the Court had adopted the wrong
criterion. Rather than speculating as to how the
issuing judge might have been affected by full compliance, he felt that the Court should examine the
extent to which other statutory provisions depend on
the fulfillment of the identification and notice requirements. See note 44 supra.
59 415 U.S. 143 (1973).

the wiretaps. Mrs. Kahn alleged that she was
not a "person as yet unknown" since the Government clearly had reason to belidve that she
would be using the telephone. Further, it appeared that a more in-depth conventional investigation might well have yielded 'probable
cause to suspect her connection with the gambling operation. The district court suppressed
the evidence and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 6 The court imposed
a discoverability requirement on government
applications. It held that the government was
required to identify all those whom a thorough
conventional investigation might discover. 61
The Supreme Court. reversed holding that
Title III imposed no discoverability requirement and that the Government was not required to identify an individual when it had no
probable cause to believe he was committing
an offense. The statute requires only that the
Government identify those who are known to
62
it, not those who are known or discoverable.
The Court concluded "that Title III requires
the naming of a person in the application or
interception order only when the law enforcement authorities have probable cause."6
The holding in Kahn is essentially negative.
The Government does not have the duty to
identify when it does not have probable cause.
The Court in Donovan addressed the same issue
from the other side. Must the Government
identify all those it has probable cause to believe
are committing the offense, or will some subset of this class suffice?
Prior case law can be divided into three
categories. First, those cases which relied on
Kahn and hold that Government failure to
identify all persons in an application for a
wiretap it has probable cause to believe are
committing the offense is a clear violation of
section 2518(1)(b)(iv) and requires suppression.6 Second, those cases that indicate that
60 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 986 (1973).
6 The court of appeals said, "if the government
did not know but should have known by prudent
investigation of the liklihood of Minnie Kahn's use
of the telephones for illicit activities, she was not a
person 'unknown.' "Id. at 196.
62 415 U.S. at 152-53.

63 Id. at 155.
64 See United

States v. Moore, 513 F.2d. 485 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d. 996
(4th Cir. 1975), remanded for consideration in light of
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this failure is a violation, but either refuse to
suppress such evidence or find that the facts
of the particular case do not show probable
cause.6" These cases usually refuse to suppress
evidence absent a showing of prejudice to the
defendant. A third school of thought is represented by United.States v. Doolittle66 which maintained that section 2518(1)(b)(iv) does not require identification of all suspects.
United States v. Moore6 7 exemplifies the first
category. Moore's conviction on a gambling
charge was reversed on the ground that it was
obtained using unlawfully intercepted wiretap
evidence. There was no question that the Government had probable cause to believe that
Moore was involved in the gambling operation.
At roughly the same time the Government
applied for the wiretap, it also applied for a
"pen register" on Moore's personal telephone.
A pen register is a device which records numbers dialed on a telephone but does not record
conversations. The appliction for the pen register clearly demonstrated probable cause.
The court in Moore thought that Kahn stood
for the proposition that "once the Government
possesses probable cause to suspect such complicity and use, the individual is 'known' within
the statutory language and must be brought to
the attention of the judge ruling on the wiretap
68
request.
The second category is represented by United
States v. Civella.69 In that case the Government
failed to identify a suspect for whom it had
probable cause. The court found that there
was "substantial compliance" with the Act and
refused to suppress the wiretap evidence, even
though it acknowledged that "in order to comply literally with the relevant subsections of the
statute, it was necessary for the Government to
Donovan, 430 U.S. 902 (1977). See also United States
v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1056 (1975).
65 See United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395 (8th
Cir. 1976), remandedfor consideration in light of Dono-

van, 430 U.S. 905 (1977). United States v. Charizio,
525 F.2d. 289 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Russo,
492 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1974).
' 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1974), affd en banc, 518
F.2d 500, (1975) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
67 513 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (interpreting 25
D.C. Code § 547(a)(1)(d), the District of Columbia's
equivalent
of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv)).
6
1Id. at 494.
69 533 F.2d. 1395 (8th Cir. 1976).

identify [all suspects in regard to
whom the
76
government had probable cause]."
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
created the third category in United States v.
Doolittle.7 In that case, the court refused to
suppress wiretap evidence involving an unidentified defendant even though the Government
had probable cause. The court concluded that
the Act had not been violated:
The defendants neither allege nor demonstrate
any prejudice to them in not being named in
the authorization ....

All defendants received

an inventory of the intercepted conversations,
were allowed to listen to the tapes and received
transcripts of the conversations prior to use
against them at trial, as if they had been named
in the order ....

We hold that there was sub-

stantial compliance with the requirements of
the Act, and that the failure to name other
defendants does not render the evidence obtained as to them
inadmissable under 18 U.S.C.
2
§ 2518(10)(a).1
The predominant rationale among those
courts in the second and third categories is
that wiretap evidence should not be suppressed
where there has been substantial governmental
compliance and the defendants cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from the alleged
violation. These courts have adopted a more
flexible approach than the rigid statutory analysis of Donovan.

The analytical model adopted in Giordano
and refined in Donovan makes a dead letter of
those statutory provisions which are not "central" to the congressional plan. It is an invitation for governmental negligence. The Court
assigns definite duties to the Government but
insures that no practical consequences will attend a breach of those duties. Even the most
well-intentioned law enforcement officials must
surely come to consider such duties as an afterthought to be complied with only if there are
no more pressing affairs. There is no indica7

Id. at 1403.
507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1974) affd en banc, 518
F.2d 500 (1975), cert. denied-, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
72 Id. at 1371-72.
73 The Court in Donovan noted that there is no
question of an intentional violation and that if there
were "we would have a different case." 429 U.S. at
436 n.23. But the Court expressly declined to reach
this issue. Id. at 439 n.26. The only reported case of
an intentional violation of § 2518 is United States v.
Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972). The wiretap
0
71
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tion that Congress intended this result in either
the statute itself or the legislative history. The
Court focuses its analysis on section 2518(10)(a).
No attempt is made to integrate this provision
with the substantive provisions which create
the right to be enforced through the suppression motion. Neither section 2515 nor 2517
gives any indication that some provisions of
section 2518 are central and others ancillary.
The statute simply authorizes the disclosure of
wiretap information as evidence when the interception was "in accordance with the provisions of this chapter"7 4 and forbids such disclosure when it would be "in violation" of the
'chapter. 5 The more flexible approach of the
lower courts which examines the peculiar facts
of each case to determine if there has been
"substantial compliance" with the provisions of
the chapter and "prejudice to the defendant"
seems more in harmony with the actual words
of the statute.
The Court's analytical model fails to consider
the suppression provisions of Title III in light
of the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule
and the congressional intent to define the scope
of the fourth amendment. It thus failed to
reglize that no hard distinction can be maintained between purely statutory violations and
those of a constitutional dimension.
In drafting Title III, Congress clearly felt
that it was implementing the commands of the
fourth amendment in the wiretap context. The
Senate Report repeatedly emphasizes the belief
that the provisions of section 2518 are constitutionally mandated. For example, in referring
to the provisions of section 2518(1), the report
says, "[e]ach of these requirements reflects the
constitutional command of particularization."76
order in Eastman "expressly waived" notice to the
defendants. Accordingly, neither mandatory nor discretionary notice was ever given. The court concluded that such communications were unlawfully
intercepted and suppressed the evidence. The court
said: "The touchstone of our decision on this aspect
of the case at bar is not one in which an inventory
was delayed but rather is one in which specific
provisions of Tide III were deliberately and advertently not followed.... This we cannot countenance." Id. at 1062.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3). See note 19 supra for full
text.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2515. See note 15 spra.
76 Tide III was drafted in response to Berger and
Katz and the drafters considered those decisions to
be authoritative pronouncements of the procedures

Since Congress enacted its own conception of
the fourth amendment's requirements in the
wiretap context, violations of the statute are
also violations of the fourth amendment. These
two classes of violations are intended to be
roughly identical. Yet the Court's analytical
approach to suppression questions arises from
the assumption that these two classes are distinct. The starting point of the Court's analysis
in Giordano was the supposed difficulty in giving simultaneous meaning to all three subsections of section 2518(10)(a). The Government
argued that "unlawfully intercepted" must include only constitutional violations and the
Court concluded that the sub-paragraph must
refer to some statutory violations and constitutional violations. The fact that Congress legislated against the background of the judicially
fashioned exclusionary rule adds an unconsidered complexity. Evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment will be suppressed
through the judicially fashioned exclusionary
rule without regard to the statute. Thus to the
extent that "unlawfully intercepted" comprehends any constitutional violations it is surplusage. But if this sub-paragraph comprehends
only statutory violations, then the other subparagraphs are surplusage since they merely
describe types of unlawful statutory. violations
comprehended under sub-paragraph (i).
An examination of the three sub-paragraphs
without regard to the confusing and unnecessary distinction between statutory and constitutional violations reveals a new way to give these
sections simultaneous meaning.7 7 Sub-paraneeded to make wiretaps constitutional. The Senate
Report says, "[i]n the course of the Opinion [Berger]
the Court delineated the constitutional criteria that
electronic surveillance legislation should contain. Tide III was drafted to meet these standards .... S.
REP., supra note 16, at 2153. Each of the sections was
intended to reflect a constitutional command. The
limitation on the duration of surveillance contained
in § 2518(4) is a "command of the constitution," Id.
at 2191. Finally, all the subsections of § 2518(1) taken
together "are intended to meet the test of the constitution that electronic surveillance techniques be used
under the most precise and discriminate circumstances, which fully comply with the requirement of
particularity." Id.
7 Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., came to a similar conclusion in Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under
Title III: Another Dissent to Giordano and Chavez, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 750 (1975). The author attacks Justice
White's distinction between "central" and "non-central" provisions in Giordano. There are other "equally
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graph (i) must refer to violations not within the
scope of sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii). Sub-paragraph (ii) deals with facially insufficient warrants. "Unlawfully intercepted" must refer to
interceptions made pursuant to facially sufficient warrants. Sub-paragraph (iii) deals with
facially sufficient warrants that are improperly
executed. "Unlawfully intercepted" must refer
to evidence resulting from a facially sufficient
warrant properly executed. Such a warrant
could only be unlawful where the issuing judge
erred in making the required findings. For
example, suppose the issuing judge erroneously finds probable cause. The warrant replausible" interpretations of "unlawfully intercepted." The author suggests that "unlawfully intercepted" should refer to interceptions which would be
criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). That
section prescribes criminal penalties for the wilful
interception of wire communications except as provided by Title III. 123 U. PA. L. REv. at 785-86.
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cites that there is probable cause and is therefore facially sufficient. Suppose further that
the warrant was properly executed. Since the
warrant in fact issued on a showing of less than
probable cause, section 2518(3)(a) has been violated. Since information gained pursuant to
such a warrant is not intercepted in accordance
with Title III, its use as evidence is unlawful
under sections 2515 and 2517. It is to these
situations that "unlawfully intercepted" must
refer.
Donovan, however, has entrenched the Giordano analysis and whatever its merits any authoritative interpretation of the statute must
utilize it. After Donovan, the course of litigation
concerning new breaches of other provisions
of section 2518 is set. The primary questionindeed the only significant question-must be
whether the section violated was "central" in
the congressional scheme to limit the use of
wiretaps.

